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NOTES AND COMMENTS

most other states in this respect, and should a case arise in its courts
involving salary discriminations between colored and white teachers it
would be possible to decide the case under the substantial equality
doctrine.
The problem of the instant case is still very much alive throughout
the Southern states, for statistics of comparative colored and white teachers' salaries for 1935-1936 in seventeen states show that for every $1.00
paid to white teachers only about $.50 was paid to colored. 26 North
Carolina seems to be somewhat more liberal than the average, the ratio
at that time being $.67 to the negro per $1.00 to the white, 27 and in
1940-1941 $.79,to the negro for each $1.00 per white.2 8 * The general
policy of North Carolina evidently seeks to bring about an equalization
of teachers' saliries, 29* but there is still some room for improvement.
It would seem that unless complete minimum equalization is achieved a
suit for injunction against such discrimination is likely to arise which,
if successful, would impose a critical and sudden strain on the educa-

tional budget.

C. D.

HOGUE, JR.

Mortgages and Deeds of Trust-Statute of Limitations Barring
Foreclosures and Right of Redemption-Nature
of Possession Required
Civil action in ejectment.1 The facts were agreed to be as follows:
The plaintiff, in the year 1925, executed a deed of trust securing notes
made by him for the balance due on the purchase price of the land
covered by the trust deed. The last of the notes matured in 1928. In
1938, more than ten years after the maturity date of the last note, the
trustee foreclosed and conveyed the land to defendant by exercising the
power of sale contained in the trust instrument. No payment of either
principal or interest was ever made on any of the notes.
to be used for colored schools, the tax was discriminatory and void under the
state constitution.
" Special Problems of Negro Education (Wilkerson, 1939). Prepared for
Advisory Committee on Education, Staff Study Number 12. Published by United

States Government Printing Office, p. 24, Table.
2"Ibid.

*State School Facts (Feb., 1942), Vol. XIV, No. 5, Table II. From this
table it is seen that there has been a continuous increase in all salaries throughout

the years and also a more rapid increase in negro wages than in white wages.
There has thus been a tendency to equalize the salaries. This table does not
show the exact situation, for it only covers salaries paid from state funds, and
those paid by the individual counties might make some difference.
8* See Greensboro Daily News, June 12, 1942, §1, p. 12, col. 2, stating that
there was a $242,000 appropriation in 1942 for the purpose of furthering the
equalization of teachers' salaries, and that the State School Commission hopes to

have all differences between colored and white teachers' salaries abolished within
two or three years.
I Ownbey v. Parkway Properties, Inc., 222 N. C. 54, 21 S.E. (2d) 900 (1942).
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Plaintiff contended that the trustee's sale was void, the power of
sale having been barred by lapse of time under the following North
Carolina statutes: (1) "The power of sale of real property contained
in any mortgage or deed of trust for the benefit of creditors shall become inoperative, and no person shall execute any such power, when an
action to foreclose such mortgage or deed of trust for the benefit of
creditors would be barred by the statute of limitations."'2 (2) The
statute of limitations relating to foreclosures: "For the foreclosure of
a mortgage, or deed in trust for creditors with a power of sale, of real
property, where the mortgagor or grantor has been in possession of the
property, within ten years after the forfeiture of the mortgage, or after
the power of sale became absolute, or within ten years after the last
'3
payment on the same."
It will be noted -that these statutes bar a power of sale or a foreclosure only when the grantor or mortgagor has been in possession
during the ten-year period. Plaintiff admitted that he had not been in
actual possession, but prosecuted his claim on the basis of constructive
possession, which he alleged to rest in him as the owner of the legal title
to the premises.
The North Carolina Supreme Court, affirming the trial court's
judgment for defendant, held that plaintiff did not have such constructive possession, since the legal title to mortgaged real property or
real property deeded in trust passes to the mortgagee or trustee under
the North Carolina rule as to the effect of such conveyances. Thus,
under the instant decision, a mortgagor or grantor in a trust deed must
show that he has been in actual possession of the premises in order to
claim a bar of foreclosure or of a power of sale under these statutes.
North Carolina has consistently followed the "title" theory in regard
to mortgages and deeds of trusts, i.e., the theory that the execution of
these instruments vests the legal title in the mortgagee or trustee 4 for
the purpose of security.5 * The majority of jurisdictions adhere to the
so-called "lien" theory.0 Under this doctrine the legal title remains in
the grantor, and the grantee takes only a lien on the property.
2 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §2589.

IN. C.

CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §437(3).
'Riddick v. Davis, 220 N. C. 120, 16 S. E. (2d) 662 (1941) ; Alexander v.
Virginia Carolina joint Stock Land Bank, 201 N. C. 449, 160 S. E. 460 (1931) ;
Weathersbee v. Goodwin, 175 N. C. 234, 95 S. E. 491 (1918); Jones v. Williams,
155 N. C. 179, 71 S. E. 222 (1911) ; Kiser v. Combs, 114 N. C. 640,.19 S. E. 664
(1894); Wittkowski v. Watkins, 84 N. C. 457 (1881); London v. Bear, 84 N. C.
266 (1881) ; 1 JONES, MORTGAGES (7th ed. 1915) §45.
I*Bank of Onslow v. Rowland Lumber Company, 193 N. C. 757, 138 S. E.
125 (1927) (holding that payment for extension of time under a contract granting
right to remove timber should be made to mortgagor, rather than to one who
became mortgagee after the execution of the original contract, since the mortgagee
has the title for purpose of security only).
1 JONES, MORTGAGES (7th ed. 1915) §17.
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In view of the firmness with which the "title" theory is established
in this state, it is difficult to understand how the plaintiff hoped to succeed in this action by arguing that he had constructive possession.
Under a North Carolina statute,7 * the owner of the legal title is presumed to be in possession of premises unless it is made to appear that
another has been in possession. Thus, constructive possession would
be in the mortgagee or trustee and not in the mortgagor or grantor.8
The first North Carolina statute relating to the time within which
foreclosure proceedings had to be brought was passed in 1826. 9 This
statute created a presumption of payment of the debt which arose ten
years after forfeiture or last payment on the debt.. It also provided
that the mortgagor's right to redeem would be presumed to have been
abandoned if not exercised within the same period. There was no
stipulation that either should be in possession in order that the statute
bar the other's right to foreclose or redeem, but the Supreme Court of
North Carolina held that possession was necessary to effect a bar. 10
In 1868, the law reached its present form."1 In an early case involving the same problem dealt with in the principal case, it was decided,
for the same reasons expressed in the principal case, that the statute
contemplated actual possession; and that, therefore, neither the right
to foreclose nor the right to redeem would be barred by the mere lapse
12
of time without such possession.
Looking at the development of the law as laid down by the foregoing
cases and statutes, it is interesting to speculate as to whether or not the
result of the principal case would have been different if North Carolina
had been a "lien" jurisdiction. In that case, the plaintiff would have
been entitled to constructive possession under the statute.'8 Would
such possession plus lapse of time be considered sufficient to raise the
bar of the statute? The writer thinks not. Only two cases involving
this point have arisen in "lien" jurisdictions. One, a Minnesota case,
said, by way of dictum, that the constructive possession which followed
the legal title of the mortgagor would be sufficient to bar the right to
foreclose after lapse of the required time. 14 The other, a Missouri

" N. C.

CODE ANN.

(Michie, 1939) §432 (erroneously cited in the principal

case as N. C CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §422).
' Crews v. Crews, 192 N. C. 679, 135 S. E. 784 (1926) ; Stevens v. Turlington,

186 N. C. 191, 119 S.E. 210 (1923); Weathersbee v. Goodwin, 175 N. C. 234,

95 S.E. 491 (1918); London v. Bear, 84 N. C. 266 (1881).
'N. C. Pub. Laws 1826, c. 28, §2, N. C. REv. CODE (Little, Brown & Co.,
1854) c. 65, §19.
"0Simmons v. Ballard, 102 N. C. 105, 9 S. E. 495 (1889).
'IN. C. CODE OF Civi. PRocEnuaR (1868) §31(3-4), N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie,
1939) §437(3-4), cited supra note 3.
' Woodlief v. Wester, 136 N. C. 162, 48 S. E. 578 (1904).
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §432, cited =ipra note 7.
N
"'See Bradley v. Norris, 63 Minn. 156, 168, 65 N. W. 357, 360 (1895).
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case, held that only actual possession would raise the bar, but was
decided on the theory that adverse possession could bar foreclosure
rather than under a statute of limitations barring foreclosures." 5
It would seem that the statute contemplates actual rather than constructive possession for the following reasons: (1) It has been established that, under our statute barring the mortgagor's right to redeem
after ten years where the mortgagee has been in possession,' 6 the possession must be actual.17 This conclusion has been reached despite the
fact that the mortgagee admittedly has constructive possession. If constructive possession will not bar the right to redeem, it is unlikely that
constructive possession would be held to bar the reciprocal right to
foreclose. (2) Although the present statute of limitations on foreclosure' 8 does not create a presumption of payment as did the original
statute, 19 the erroneous idea that the bar is based on a presumption of
20
payment has persisted even down to the time of the principal case.
There is nothing in the nature of constructive possession which logically should give rise to such a presumption. Constructive possession
is but an academic legal concept. Actual possession, on the other hand,
is a fact, and one on which a presumption of a right to continue in
possession might well be based. Thus, it is almost certain that the
legislators who saw fit to have the bar raised by the coexistence of two
elements, i.e., lapse of time plus possession, were thinking in terms of
actual possession.
Previous to the enactment of the statute barring a power of sale in
a mortgage or trust deed when an action to foreclose would be
barred, 21 it was held that a power of sale would not be barred by the
statutes relating to actions to foreclose. It was reasoned that the statutes of limitation barred only "actions," and that the exercise of a power
of sale was not an "action" within the meaning of the statutes. Mortgagees and trustees under instruments containing a power of sale could,
therefore, enforce their security by sale after the action to foreclose was
barred. 22 The statute barring powers of sale prevents such action now.
It is not a mere statute of limitations which must be pleaded. Rather,
23
it is a mandatory expression of legislative will.
Qty
10 G
'
'

of St. Louis v. Priest, 103 Mo. 652, 15 S. W. 988 (1890).
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §437(4).
Crews v. Crews, 192 N. C. 679. 135 S. E. 784 (1926).

N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §437(3), cited mspra notes 3 and 11.
C. RZEV. CODE (Little, Brown & Co., 1854) c. 65, §19.

1N.

'20See Ownbey y. Park~iay Properties, Inc., 222 N. C.

54, 56, 21 S. E. (2d)

900, 902 (1942), cited supra note 1.
"N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §2589, cited supra note 2.
"Miller v. Coxe, 133 N. C. 578, 45 S. E. 940 (1903); Cone v. Hyatt, 132
N. C. 810, 44 S. E. 678 (1903) ; Menzel v. 'Hinton, 132 N. C. 660, 44 S. E. 385

(1903).
" Spain v. Hines, 214 N. C. 432, 200 S. E. 25 (1938).
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Attention is called to the following statement inadvertently made by
the court in the case under discussion: "The mortgagor has no constructive possession and if he is not in actual possession the statute runs
against and bars his right of redemption if he fails to act within the
ten-year period." 24 This, of course, is not true unless the mortgagee is
in actual possession. Where no one is in possession neither the right
to redeem nor the right to foreclose is barred.2 5 The court stated the
rule correctly farther on in the opinion. Unfortunately, the abovequoted misstatement was incorporated into the headnote in the North
CarolinaReports as being the main law of the case. The statement is
also given some attention in the headnotes in the Southeastern Reporter,
but is not emphasized.
The court showed by its statements that it was aware of the fact
that the conclusion reached in the principal case serves to make the
work of the abstracter more burdensome. He must ascertain the past
and present status of the possession before he can form a final conclusion in regard to a mortgage or trust deed which, on the record
evidence, is barred by lapse of time. The decision, however, undoubtedly interpreted the law in accord with sound principles of reasoning
and in harmony with the legislative intent.
JOEL DENTON.

u'See Ownbey v. Parkway Properties, Inc., 222 N. C. 54, 56, 21 S. E. (2d)

900, 902 (1942).

" Crews v. Crews, 192 N. C. 679, 135 S. E. 784 (1926), cited supra notes 8

and 17.

